[12653] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
RE: Scientists question electronic voting
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Trei, Peter)
Thu Mar 6 15:14:31 2003
X-Original-To: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
From: "Trei, Peter" <ptrei@rsasecurity.com>
To: "'Francois Grieu'" <fgrieu@micronet.fr>
Cc: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2003 13:05:15 -0500
> Francois Grieu[SMTP:fgrieu@micronet.fr]
>
> Peter Trei wrote:
>
> > I'd prefer that the printed receipt be retained at the polling
> > station, after the voter has had an opportunity to examine it.
> > This serves two purposes: First, it prevents the vote selling
> > described above, and second, if a recount is required, it allows
> > the recount to be done on the basis of a trustworthy record,
> > already certified by the voter as accurate.
>
> Then there is the problem that the printed receipt must not be usable
> to determine who voted for who, even knowing in which order the
> voters went to the machine. Therefore the printed receipts must be
> shuffled. Which brings us straight back to papers in a box, that we
> shake before opening.
>
> Every way I look at it, electronic voting has a hard time to match
> the resilience to abuse of the traditional
> bulletin-in-an-enveloppe-in-a-box.
>
> Francois Grieu
>
I absolutely agree. Here in the US, where voters often have to make
over a dozen choices each time they vote, the value of automating
the process is significant. But it *must* be done in a way which
increases voter confidence in the result.
Ballot boxes are also subject to many forms of fraud. But a dual
system (electronic backed up by paper) is more resistant to
attack then either alone.
Peter
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@wasabisystems.com
