[12641] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
RE: Scientists question electronic voting
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Ian Brown)
Thu Mar 6 12:21:44 2003
X-Original-To: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
From: Ian Brown <I.Brown@cs.ucl.ac.uk>
To: "'Trei, Peter'" <ptrei@rsasecurity.com>
Cc: cryptography <cryptography@wasabisystems.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2003 15:38:11 -0000
In-Reply-To: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A04D4A63F@exna07.securitydynamics.com>
Peter Trei wrote:
> I'd prefer that the printed receipt be retained at the
> polling station, after the voter has had an opportunity to
> examine it. This serves two purposes: First, it prevents the
> vote selling described above, and second, if a recount is
> required, it allows the recount to be done on the basis of a
> trustworthy record, already certified by the voter as accurate.
Indeed, that's essential for both the reasons you state.
Mercuri's design is for the voter to see the printed receipt behind a
glass screen. They then press a "Yes" or "No" button to either vote and
send the receipt to the trustworthy record, or void it and send the
receipt to the bin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@wasabisystems.com
