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Re: The perils of security tools

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Simon Josefsson)
Tue May 27 09:56:10 2008

From: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
To: Taral <taralx@gmail.com>
Cc: Cryptography <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
Date: Tue, 27 May 2008 11:38:43 +0200
In-Reply-To: <fa0147d90805261419v76c47229v9fb34082427fc07e@mail.gmail.com>
	(Taral's message of "Mon, 26 May 2008 14:19:37 -0700")

Taral <taralx@gmail.com> writes:

> On 5/26/08, Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org> wrote:
>>  For example, reading a lot of data from linux's /dev/urandom will
>>  deplete the entropy pool in the kernel, which effectively makes reads
>>  from /dev/random stall.  The two devices uses the same entropy pool.
>
> That's a bug in the way the kernel hands out entropy to multiple
> concurrent consumers. I don't think it's a semantic issue.

Do you have any references?  Several people have brought this up before
and have been told that the design with depleting the entropy pool is
intentional.

Still, the semantics of /dev/*random is not standardized anywhere, and
the current implementation is sub-optimal from a practical point of
view, so I think we are far away from an even OK situation.

/Simon

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