[121482] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Cruising the stacks and finding stuff
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Jack Lloyd)
Wed Apr 23 17:04:52 2008
Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2008 12:18:03 -0400
From: Jack Lloyd <lloyd@randombit.net>
To: Cryptography <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
Mail-Followup-To: Cryptography <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
In-Reply-To: <871w4w4vas.fsf@snark.cb.piermont.com>
On Wed, Apr 23, 2008 at 08:20:27AM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> There are a variety of issues. Smart cards have limited capacity. Many
> key agreement protocols yield only limited amounts of key
> material. I'll leave it to others to describe why a rational engineer
> might use fewer key bits, but suffice it to say, there are quite
> rational reasons. I'll agree that if you have no tradeoffs, you might
> as well use longer keys, but if you really have no tradeoffs, you
> would prefer to use a one time pad, too. All real engineering is about
> tradeoffs.
I think one point worth making is that we probably don't really know
how to make a cipher that is secure to, say, 2^512 operations (or
2^1024 or 2^4096 or whatever). For instance if you took Serpent or AES
or Twofish and modified it to support 512-bit keys, I don't believe
the resulting cipher would actually be secure to 2^512
operations... to guess completely at random, I'd say they would be
more like 2^300 or so. (Have any block ciphers with 256-bit
block/512-bit key been proposed/studied? I have not been following FSE
and similar conferences of late)
Making a cipher that uses an N bit key but is only secure to 2^M
operations with M<N is, firstly, considered broken in many circles, as
well as being inefficient (why generate/transmit/store 512 bit keys
when it only provides the security of a ~300 bit (or whatever) key
used with a perfect algorithm aka ideal cipher - why not use the
better cipher and save the bits).
-Jack
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