[117909] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Protection for quasi-offline memory nabbing
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Steven M. Bellovin)
Fri Mar 21 15:00:49 2008
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2008 01:56:49 +0000
From: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu>
To: Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>
Cc: Cryptography <cryptography@metzdowd.com>, Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>
In-Reply-To: <CC30C099-2FA2-44C1-8572-672A17220122@callas.org>
I've been thinking about similar issues. It seems to me that just
destroying the key schedule is a big help -- enough bits will change in
the key that data recovery using just the damaged key is hard, per
comments in the paper itself.
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