[115587] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: cold boot attacks on disk encryption
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Ali, Saqib)
Thu Feb 21 19:03:50 2008
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2008 15:40:32 -0800
From: "Ali, Saqib" <docbook.xml@gmail.com>
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
Cc: "Jon Callas" <jon@callas.org>, cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <87d4qplxua.fsf@snark.cb.piermont.com>
i think in most cases tamper-resistant is sufficient - provided the
device that can detect an attempt of tampering, and erase itself. DRAM
chips referred to in this attack are not tamper-resistant.
http://www.linkedin.com/in/encryption
On Thu, Feb 21, 2008 at 2:59 PM, Perry E. Metzger <perry@piermont.com> wrote:
>
> "Ali, Saqib" <docbook.xml@gmail.com> writes:
>
> > How about TPM? Would this type of attack work on a tamper-resistant ver1.2 TPM?
>
> The phrase is "tamper resistant", not "tamper proof". Depending on how
> determined your attackers are, pretty much anything depending on
> tamper resistant hardware will fall. As always, the question is
> whether what you are protecting is worth more than the attackers would
> have to spend on the attack.
>
> --
>
>
> Perry E. Metzger perry@piermont.com
>
--
Saqib Ali, CISSP, ISSAP
http://www.full-disk-encryption.net
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com
