[107291] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Hushmail in U.S. v. Tyler Stumbo
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Ian G)
Mon Nov 5 13:40:03 2007
Date: Fri, 02 Nov 2007 18:23:30 +0100
From: Ian G <iang@systemics.com>
To: John Levine <johnl@iecc.com>
CC: Jon Callas <jon@callas.org>, cryptography@metzdowd.com,
auto37159@hushmail.com
In-Reply-To: <032E7152-CA21-4347-90AE-9774E5ABDD2E@callas.org>
Jon Callas wrote:
>
> On Nov 1, 2007, at 10:49 AM, John Levine wrote:
>
>>> Since email between hushmail accounts is generally PGPed. (That is
>>> the point, right?)
>>
>> Hushmail is actually kind of a scam. In its normal configuration,
>> it's in effect just webmail with an HTTPS connection and a long
>> password. It will generate and verify PGP signatures and encryption
>> for mail it sends and receives, but they generate and maintain their
>> users' PGP keys.
>>
>> There's a Java applet that's supposed to do end to end encryption, but
>> since it's with the same key that Hushmail knows, what's the point?
>>
>
> I'm sorry, but that's a slur. Hushmail is not a scam.
It certainly was not a scam when I was involved (cryptix
guys did some part of the original java crypto) many years
ago. The private key is encrypted by your passphrase, so
the private key is not available to Hushmail.
The basic concept is of course somewhat limited by what it
tries to do, but it is sound. Hushmail published the applet
that did all this, and it was possible to read the code and
attack it. At least one flaw was found, from deep dim memory.
There is for example a danger that hushmail could simply
change the applet, and then acquire someone's key. A victim
would not notice so easily because there isn't much in the
browser that stops the applet from changing code. That's a
threat, and they were aware of it, but it's also a bit of a
high risk one, as, if it were spotted, their credibility
would be shot.
In practice, the larger danger with email is that the
high-profile threats to email security are on the client
side. Either you, your own machine, the other guy's
machine, or the other guy. I was involved in one case where
super-secret stuff was shared through hushmail, and was also
dual encrypted with non-hushmail-PGP for added security. In
the end, the lawyers came in and scarfed up the lot with
subpoenas ... all the secrets were revealed to everyone they
should never have been revealed to. We don't have a crypto
tool for embarrassing secrets to fade away.
iang
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