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Linux Security FAQ Update#9: Splitvt Vulnerability

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Alexander O. Yuriev)
Tue Jan 2 21:39:49 1996

Date: Tue, 2 Jan 1996 18:12:19 -0500 (EST)
From: "Alexander O. Yuriev" <alex@bach.cis.temple.edu>
To: Linux Security Mailing List <linux-security@tarsier.cv.nrao.edu>
cc: Linux Announce Submit <linux-announce@stc06.ctd.ornl.gov>,
        Sam Lantinga <slouken@cs.ucdavis.edu>

[ Don't laugh. This message somehow was sitting in Bach's mail queue 
since Dec 18, 1995! -- alex ]



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

                          Linux Security FAQ Update
                            SplitVT Vulnerability
                          Dec 18, 1995 14:48:02 EST                           
      Copyright (C) 1995 Alexander O. Yuriev (alex@bach.cis.temple.edu)
                              CIS Laboratories
                             TEMPLE  UNIVERSITY
                                   U.S.A.


 =============================================================================
 This is an official update of the Linux security FAQ, and it is supposed to
                be signed by one of the following PGP keys:

 
       
     pub  1024/9ED505C5 1995/12/06 Jeffrey A. Uphoff <juphoff@nrao.edu>
                  Jeffrey A. Uphoff <jeff.uphoff@linux.org>      
           1024/EFE347AD 1995/02/17 Olaf Kirch <okir@monad.swb.de>
 1024/ADF3EE95 1995/06/08 Linux Security FAQ Primary Key <Alexander O. Yuriev>


    Unless you are able to verify at least one of signatures, please be very
                    careful when following instructions.

   Linux Security WWW: http://bach.cis.temple.edu/linux/linux-security

             linux-security & linux-alert mailing list archives:
	
            ftp://linux.nrao.edu/pub/linux/security/list-archive

 =============================================================================


   ABSTRACT

   		A vulnerability exists in the Splitvt program prior to
		version 1.6.3, including the Splitvt program in the
		Slackware 3.0 Linux distribution. The exploit scripts
		circulating over the Internet allow local users to gain
		root access using the Splitvt


   RISK ASSESMENT

   		If a splitvt binary version prior to 1.6.3 is a
		setuid-to-root program, any local user that can execute it
		can gain root access on the system.

   SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM

   		To determine if your version of Splitvt is vulnerable use
   		command
		
					splitvt -version 

		If the version of your splitvt binary is prior to 1.6.3, locate
		it and immidiately remove setuid bit from it using a command
		similiar to

					chmod 111 /usr/bin/splitvt

   DISTRIBUTION FIXES


   		Red Hat Commercial Linux 2.0 & 2.1

			Red Hat Linux distribution does not include Splitvt.
			If you installed your own version of Splitvt, please
			follow the intstuctions in the Other Distributions
			Section.

		Caldera Network Desktop 

			Preview II does not include Splitvt. If you
			installed your own version of Splitvt, please follow
			the intstuctions in the Other Distributions Section.

		Debian

			Debian/GNU Linux distribution does not include
			Splitvt. If you installed your own version of
			Splitvt, please follow the intstuctions in the Other
			Distributions Section.

		Slackware

			Version 3.0. 

			      Patrick J. Volkerding
			      (volkerdi@mhd1.moorhead.msus.edu) has supplied
			      information about the official patch for
			      Slackware 3.0. The official patch can be
			      obtained from one of the following URLs:
			      
ftp://ftp.cdrom.com/pub/linux/slackware/patches/splitvt-patch.tgz
ftp://bach.cis.temple.edu/pub/Linux/Security/DISTRIBUTION-FIXES/Slackware-3.0/splitvt-patch.tgz
ftp://linux.nrao.edu/pub/linux/security/DISTRIBUTION-FIXES/Slackware-3.0/splitvt-patch.tgz

			       Please verify the MD5 hash of the file prior to installing
			       it.
			       
	214ce5016dc457acb6e6dd381794d285  splitvt-patch.tgz
	
				In order to install the patch use command
				
			installpkg splitvt-patch.tgz
						      	
				as root.


			Other versions of Slackware

				Please consider upgrading to Slackware 3. In
				the nearest future the Linux Security FAQ
				Updates would stop containing any
				information about versions of Slackware
				prior to 3.


		Other Linux Distributions:

			If your distribution is not listed in this LSF Update 
			and is vulnerable or if you installed splitvt in a
			distribution that does not support it, you would
			need to upgrade to splitvt version 1.6.3 by
			compiling the source code.

			The official source code of splitvt 1.6.3 can be
			obtained from one of the following URLs:

ftp://dandelion.ceres.ca.gov/pub/splitvt/splitvt-1.6.3.tar
ftp://bach.cis.temple.edu/pub/Linux/Security/splitvt-1.6.3.tar
ftp://linux.nrao.edu/pub/linux/security/splitvt-1.6.3.tar

			Please verify the MD5 hash of the file prior to
			installing it.

eec2fe2c5b4a3958261197905a9d9c81  splitvt-1.6.3.tar

 

	CREDITS

		Information in this update is based on the release of the
		Avalon Security Research. We would also like to thank
		Sam Lantinga (slouken@cs.ucdavis.edu) and Patrick J.
		Volkerding (volkerdi@mhd1.moorhead.msus.ed) for their prompt
		response to the problem.

 
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============================================================================
Alexander O. Yuriev		            Email: alex@bach.cis.temple.edu
CIS Labs, TEMPLE UNIVERSITY   WWW: http://bach.cis.temple.edu/personal/alex
Philadelphia, PA, USA	 	
			
 KeyID: 1024/D62D4489 Key Fingerprint: AE84534377CCC4E2  37B13C4D8CD3D501 

Unless otherwise stated, everything above is my personal opinion and not an
               opinion of any organisation affiliated with me.
=============================================================================

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