[1715] in linux-security and linux-alert archive
[linux-security] Re: Towards a solution of tmp-file problems (fwd)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Allen Bolderoff)
Fri Mar 13 07:18:26 1998
To: linux-security@redhat.com
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 12 Mar 1998 11:27:26 BST."
<01IUKSJ70HB6000EGL@alpham.uni-mb.si>
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 1998 17:27:49 +1130
From: Allen Bolderoff <allen@gist.net.au>
Resent-From: linux-security@redhat.com
Reply-To: linux-security@redhat.com
my 2c
All of these solutions have good & bad merit, but the bottom line is this,
whilst a user is able to create symlinks into the /tmp directory most fail.
would it be possible to tell the kernel not to follow symlinks out of the /tmp
directory as a broad based rule?
or have the kernel create a virtual filesystem that doesn't allow
symlinks/hardlinks?
IMHO, the only solution is going to be kernel based in this manner.
therefore if someone/thing creates a symlink, it would actually symlink to a
chrooted filesystem that only exists within the kernel. ie, if I do
ln -sf /etc/sendmail.cf /tmp/tmpfile.xxx
it would actually not link to .etc.sendmail.cf, but to a non existant file
within the kernel (a chrooted virtual non useable filesystem)
just a thought.
Allen
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