[1218] in linux-security and linux-alert archive
Re: [linux-security] libc 5.4.7
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (David Holland)
Sun Oct 13 12:57:03 1996
From: David Holland <dholland@eecs.harvard.edu>
To: alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk (Alan Cox)
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 1996 18:41:26 -0400 (EDT)
Cc: dholland@eecs.harvard.edu, alan@cymru.net, potato@dsnet.com,
linux-gcc@vger.rutgers.edu, linux-security@tarsier.cv.nrao.edu
In-Reply-To: <m0vB6cw-0005FdC@lightning.swansea.linux.org.uk> from "Alan Cox" at Oct 9, 96 10:57:18 pm
>>> Does this also drop the variables from programs run by a setuid program ?
>> No. libc ignores the variables; it does not clear them.
>
> So a setuid app that runs an app with uid set to the euid is still a walking
> road accident. (like telnetd running login)
Yes. IMO, one should not do that (personally I wouldn't count on the
right thing happening with LD_*, much less any other environment
variables, rlimits, utmp entries, umasks, or what-have-you.)
--
- David A. Holland | VINO project home page:
dholland@eecs.harvard.edu | http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/vino
