[93296] in Cypherpunks
Re: remailer resistancs to attack
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Steve Schear)
Fri Jan 16 13:02:04 1998
In-Reply-To: <v03102800b0e473032403@[207.167.93.63]>
Date: Fri, 16 Jan 1998 09:38:04 -0800
To: Tim May <tcmay@got.net>, Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk>, rdl@MIT.EDU
From: Steve Schear <schear@lvdi.net>
Cc: eternity@internexus.net, cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
Reply-To: Steve Schear <schear@lvdi.net>
At 6:37 PM -0800 1/15/98, Tim May wrote:
>At 5:25 PM -0800 1/15/98, Adam Back wrote:
>>Ryan Lackey <rdl@mit.edu> writes:
>>However it seems to me that the weakest point is the remailer network.
>>It seems likely that it would be much easier for governments to shut
>>down the remailer network than it would be to shut down USENET. There
>>are only around 20 or so remailers, and they all have known IP
>>addresses, operators, localities, etc. I expect the spooks could shut
>>them down with less than 1 days notice if they wanted to.
>
>Well, I have long argued for the need for thousands of remailers, esp. the
>"everyone a remailer" model.
>
>But, although I agree we need many more remailers, I think Adam overstates
>the ease with which remailers can be shut down, at least in the U.S.
Came across this paper and thought it might address remailer reliability, "How to Maintain Authenticated Communication in the Presence of Break-ins," http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~tcryptol/OLD/old-02.html
--Steve
