[87293] in Cypherpunks
engineering infowar disasters (was Re: How the FBI/NSA forces can further twist SAFE)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Adam Back)
Sat Sep 27 20:54:13 1997
Date: Sun, 28 Sep 1997 00:56:51 +0100
From: Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk>
To: holovacs@idt.net
CC: berezina@qed.net, brock@well.com, declan@well.com, shamrock@cypherpunks.to,
tien@well.com, cypherpunks@cyberpass.net,
fight-censorship@vorlon.mit.edu
In-reply-to: <199709262107.RAA17847@u1.farm.idt.net> (message from jay
holovacs on Fri, 26 Sep 1997 15:42 -0500)
Reply-To: Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk>
Jay Holovacs <holovacs@idt.net> writes:
> [dangers of horseman spin or reichstag fire tatics from Free & gang]
>
> On the other hand a publicized security disaster or "infowar" attack
> could spin things in the other direction.
Reckon cypherpunks can knock up a few of those.
So lets here some ideas for good photogenic infowar attacks which show
that the lack of crypto is dangerous.
Stuff internet protocols at low level (say DNS) due to lack of crypto
and too centralised design? We could do that I think. The guy from
alternic rigged DNS root to point at him, we could rig it to point to
zip.
In the clear or poorly ciphered banking protocols (say private leased
lines).
etc.
Adam
--
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