[87161] in Cypherpunks
Re: Remailer Attack
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Alex de Joode)
Fri Sep 26 08:12:50 1997
Date: Fri, 26 Sep 1997 13:14:56 +0200 (MET DST)
From: Alex de Joode <usura@sabotage.org>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com, cypherpunks@ssz.com
Reply-To: Alex de Joode <usura@sabotage.org>
Anonymous sez:
: According to Raph's remailer stats, the remailers have widely varying
: latencies. Given that only a few remailers have latencies which are
: acceptably low, the list of usable remailers is quite low.
: If the user of the remailer, Monty Cantsin for example, signs his
: messages, a fairly accurate measure of total transit time is obtained.
: The total transit time gives clues to the remailers which were
: actually used in the chain. In an of itself, this may not comprise
: the user, but combined with other weaknesses it will cause the
: attacker to be significantly more confident of identification
: hypotheses.
: The remailers should all have about the same latency. 0 seconds seems
: like a good Schelling point. What would it take to reduce remailer
: latency to under 60 seconds for most of the remailers? Do people need
: old 486s to dedicate to the task? Do they need money? Better
: software?
Most remailers support a feature called 'latency', so one can
choose the latency one desires for a message.
ie:
::
Anon-To: username@host-name-here.nl
Latency: +00:00
This message will be remailed imediately, no queing etc.
--
Alex de Joode | usura@SABOTAGE.ORG | http://www.sabotage.org
Sabotage Internet: Your Internet Problem Provider.
