[43904] in Cypherpunks
Re: "lack" of export control rules
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Matthew James Sheppard)
Fri Nov 24 19:21:07 1995
From: Matthew James Sheppard <Matthew.Sheppard@Comp.VUW.AC.NZ>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Fri, 24 Nov 1995 06:07:51 -0000."
<Pine.BSD.3.91.951124054104.12402A-100000@usr4.primenet.com>
Date: Sat, 25 Nov 1995 13:17:48 +1300
The shadowy figure took form and announced "I am attila and I say ...
> On Thu, 23 Nov 1995, sameer wrote:
> a> The feds have never established a general policy.
>
> in other words, business as usual with the Feds. If there is no "book"
> on what is or is not legal v/v ITAR, and the agency responsible will not
> communicate, it empirically says: "...well, be reasonable to meet the
> intent of the law, but we will not tell you what is really expected;
> however, if, in the futute, we decide what we really want, we will bust
> you if you did not fully comply despite your good intentions --and, if
> that does not fly, we'll charge you with conspiracy...."
Just had an idea for Netscapes case. If we suppose that the ITAR
governors ever managed to agree on a purely electronic based, export
controlled distribution method then Netscape can write a Java applet
or LiveScript to perform the task. This would mean a *click here to
download* interface and bypass the obfuscated process that dogs MIT
pgp.
--
<URL:http://www.comp.vuw.ac.nz/~matt>
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