[41602] in Cypherpunks
Re: mental cryptography
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Scott Brickner)
Mon Oct 16 19:16:04 1995
To: Nathan Loofbourrow <loofbour@cis.ohio-state.edu>
Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
In-Reply-To: (Your message of Sat, 14 Oct 1995 08:43:21 EDT.)
<199510141243.IAA27588@hammond.cis.ohio-state.edu>
Date: Mon, 16 Oct 1995 17:27:39 -0500
From: Scott Brickner <sjb@universe.digex.net>
Nathan Loofbourrow writes:
>It may be that the approach is off anyway. Credit cards have only
>signature verification -- if the salesperson bothers -- because stolen
>cards are reported. You don't need a strong authentication technique
>if a stolen card is easy to cancel.
The card's easy to cancel, but the cash ain't. Credit cards are
cleared with the issuer. Digital cash with smart cards acting as
transaction observers don't need this. The thief need only transfer
the cash from the stolen card to his own, just like he does with
regular cash.
>Even with a weak PIN system for authentication, you can always provide
>a "duress" PIN, right?
Sounds like a better choice.
