[109522] in Cypherpunks
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daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Mahou Shoujo Pixy Misa)
Sat Mar 27 19:01:01 1999
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 1999 01:49:34 +0200 (EET)
From: Mahou Shoujo Pixy Misa <waste@zor.hut.fi>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
cc: iufo@world.std.com
Reply-To: Mahou Shoujo Pixy Misa <waste@zor.hut.fi>
www.villagevoice.com/features/9908/vest_madsen.shtml
February 24 - March 2, 1999=20
A Most Unusual Collection Agency=20
How the U.S. undid UNSCOM through its empire of electronic ears
By Jason Vest and Wayne Madsen
When Saddam Hussein raised the possibility of attacking U.S. planes in
Turkey last week, his threats illustrated what many in diplomatic
circles regard as an international disgrace=97 the emasculation of the
UN by the U.S.
When UNSCOM, the UN's arms-inspection group for Iraq, was created in
1991, it drew on personnel who, despite their respective
nationalities, would serve the UN. Whatever success UNSCOM achieved,
however, was in spite of its multinational makeup. While a devoted
group of UN staffers managed to set up an independent unit aimed at
finding Saddam's weapons and ways of concealing them, other countries
seeking to do business with sanctions-impaired Iraq=97 notably France
and Russia=97 used inspectors as spies for their own ends.
But what ultimately killed UNSCOM were revelations that the U.S.
government had manipulated it by assuming control of its intelligence
apparatus last spring (or perhaps even earlier by using the group to
slip spies into Iraq) not so much to aid UNSCOM's mission, but to get
information for use in future aerial bombardments. When stories to
this effect broke last month, however, there was almost no consistency
in descriptions of the agencies involved or techniques used. The New
York Times, for example, said only one CIA spy had been sent into
Baghdad last March to set up an automated eavesdropping device. Time
had multiple Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) operatives planting
bugs around Baghdad throughout 1998. The Wall Street Journal referred
to the use of one "device" from the National Security Agency (NSA)
last year and "a series of espionage operations used by the U.S.
[since] 1996 to monitor the communications" of Saddam and his elite.
When probing the world of espionage, rarely does a clear picture
emerge. But according to a handful of published sources, as well as
assessments by independent experts and interviews with current and
former intelligence officers, the U.S. government's prime mover in
Iraqi electronic surveillance was most likely a super-secret
organization run jointly by the the CIA and the NSA=97 the spy agency
charged with gathering signals intelligence (known as SIGINT)=97 called
the Special Collection Service. Further, there is evidence to suggest
that the Baghdad operation was an example of the deployment of a
highly classified, multinational SIGINT agreement=97 one that may have
used Australians to help the U.S. listen in=97 months after the CIA
failed to realize the U.S. objective of overthrowing Saddam Hussein
through covert action.
According to former UNSCOM chief inspector Scott Ritter, when the U.S.
took over the group's intelligence last year, a caveat was added
regarding staffing: only international personnel with U.S. clearances
could participate. "This requirement," says Ritter, "really shows the
kind of perversion of mission that went on. The U.S. was in control,
but the way it operated from day one was, U.S. runs it, but it had to
be a foreigner [with a clearance] operating the equipment."
Under the still-classified 1948 UKUSA signals intelligence treaty,
eavesdropping agencies of the U.S., United Kingdom, Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand share the same clearances. According to Federation of
American Scientists intelligence analyst John Pike, this gives the
U.S. proxies for electronic espionage: "In the context of UKUSA, think
of NSA as one office with five branches," he says. As UNSCOM
demonstrates, though, sometimes the partnership gets prickly; the
British, according to Ritter, withdrew their personnel following the
U.S.'s refusal to explain "how the data was going to be used."
(According to a longtime British intelligence officer, there was
another reason: lingering bad feelings over the NSA's cracking a
secret UN code used by British and French peacekeepers during a
Bosnian UN mission.) At this point, says Ritter, he was instructed to
ask the Australian government for a "collection" specialist. "We
deployed him to Baghdad in July of 1998," recalls Ritter. "In early
August, when I went to Baghdad, he pulled me aside and told me he had
concerns about what was transpiring.
He said there was a very high volume of data, and that he was getting
no feedback about whether it was good, bad, or useful. He said that it
was his experience that this was a massive intelligence collection
operation=97 one that was not in accordance with what UNSCOM was
supposed to be doing."
In other words, the Australian =97 most likely an officer from the
Defence Signals Directorate, Australia's NSA subsidiary, who was
supposed to have been working for the UN =97 may have been effectively
spying for the U.S. Stephanie Jones, DSD's liaison to NSA, did not
take kindly to a Voice inquiry about this subject; indeed, despite
being reached at a phone number with an NSA headquarters prefix, she
would not even confirm her position with DSD. However, a former
high-ranking U.S. intelligence official said that such a scenario was
probable. "The relationship between the UKUSA partners has always been
of enormous value to U.S. intelligence, even when their governments
have been on the opposite sides of policy issues," the official said.
"I would not be surprised at all if the Aussies happened to be the
ones who actually did this [at U.S. behest]."
With an intelligence community of over a dozen components,
billion-dollar budgets, and cutting-edge technology, the U.S. can cast
a wide net, be it with human sources or signals interception. Iraq,
however, has presented a special challenge since Saddam's Ba'ath party
took power in 1968. "In Iraq," says Israeli intelligence expert
Amatzai Baram, "you are dealing with what is arguably the best
insulated security and counterintelligence operation in the world. The
ability of Western or even unfriendly Arab states to penetrate the
system is very, very limited."
According to the former Cairo station chief of the Australian Secret
Intelligence Service (ASIS), the West got this message loud and clear
after Iraqi counterintelligence pulled British MI6 case officers off a
Baghdad street in the mid '80s and took them to a warehouse on the
outskirts of town. "They had arrayed before them the various agents
they had been running," the ex=ADASIS officer told the Australian
Broadcasting Corporation in 1994. "There were wires hanging from the
rafters in the warehouse. All the men were strung up by wires around
their testicles and they were killed in front of the faces of their
foreign operators, and they were told, you had better get out and
never come back."
When UNSCOM was inaugurated in 1991, it quickly became apparent that
the organization's intelligence capability would depend largely on
contributions from various UN member countries. According to several
intelligence community sources, while the CIA did provide UNSCOM with
information, and, later, serious hardware like a U-2 spy plane, the
focus of the U.S. intelligence community at the time was on working
with anti-Saddam groups in and around Iraq to foment a coup.
What resulted, as investigative authors Andrew and Patrick Cockburn
demonstrate in their just published book Out of the Ashes: The
Resurrection of Saddam Hussein, were two of the most colossally
bungled CIA covert operations since the Bay of Pigs. While details of
one of the failed operations were widely reported, the Cockburns
fleshed out details of an arguably worse coup attempt gone awry in
June 1996. Iraqi counterintelligence had not only managed to finger
most of the suspects in advance, but months before had even captured
an encrypted mobile satellite communications device that the CIA gave
the plotters. Adding insult to injury, the Cockburns report, Iraqi
counterintelligence used the CIA's own device to notify them of their
failure: "We have arrested all your people," the CIA team in Amman,
Jordan, reportedly was told via their uplink. "You might as well pack
up and go home."
Some UNSCOM staffers=97 first under Russian Nikita Smidovich, later
under American Scott Ritter=97 managed to create what amounted to a
formidable micro- espionage unit devoted to fulfilling UNSCOM's
mission. Between information passed on from various countries and use
of unspecified but probably limited surveillance equipment, the
inspectors were gathering a great deal. But in March 1998, according
to Ritter, the U.S. told UNSCOM chair Richard Butler of Australia that
it wanted to "coordinate" UNSCOM's intelligence gathering.
Ritter insists that no U.S. spies under UNSCOM cover could have been
operating in Baghdad without his knowledge prior to his resignation in
August 1998. However, as veteran spies point out, if they were, Ritter
probably wouldn't have known. A number of sources interviewed by the
Voice believe it possible that Special Collection Service personnel
may have been operating undercover in Baghdad.
According to a former high-ranking intelligence official, SCS was
formed in the late 1970s after competition between the NSA's
embassy-based eavesdroppers and the CIA's globe-trotting bugging
specialists from its Division D had become counterproductive. While
sources differ on how SCS works=97 some claim its agents never leave
their secret embassy warrens where they perform close- quarters
electronic eavesdropping, while others say agents operate embassy-
based equipment in addition to performing riskier "black-bag" jobs, or
break- ins, for purposes of bugging=97 "there's a lot of pride taken in
what SCS has accomplished," the former official says.
Intriguingly, the only on-the-record account of the Special Collection
Service has been provided not by an American but by a Canadian. Mike
Frost, formerly of the Communications Security Establishment=97 Canada's
NSA equivalent=97 served as deputy director of CSE's SCS counterpart and
was trained by the SCS. In a 1994 memoir, Frost describes the
complexities of mounting "special collection" operations=97 finding ways
to transport sophisticated eavesdropping equipment in diplomatic
pouches without arousing suspicion, surreptitiously assembling a
device without arousing suspicion in his embassy, technically
troubleshooting under less than ideal conditions=97 and also devotes
considerable space to describing visits to SCS's old College Park
headquarters.
"It is not the usual sanitorium-clean atmosphere you would expect to
find in a top-secret installation," writes Frost. "Wires everywhere,
jerry-rigged gizmos everywhere, computers all over the place, some
people buzzing around in three- piece suits, and others in jeans and
t-shirts. [It was] the ultimate testing and engineering centre for any
espionage equipment." Perhaps one of its most extraordinary areas was
its "live room," a 30-foot-square area where NSA and CIA devices were
put through dry runs, and where engineers simulated the electronic
environment of cities where eavesdroppers are deployed. Several years
ago, according to sources, SCS relocated to a new, 300-acre, three-
building complex disguised as a corporate campus and shielded by a
dense forest outside Beltsville, Maryland. Curious visitors to the
site will find themselves stopped at a gate by a Department of Defense
police officer who, if one lingers, will threaten arrest.
There are good reasons, explains an old NSA hand, for havingelectronic
ears on terra firma in addition to satellites. "If you're listening to
something from thousands of miles up, the footprint to sort through is
so huge, and finding what you are looking for is not a simple chore.
If you know more or less specifically what you want, it's easier to
get it in close proximity. And if it happens to be a low-powered
signal, it may not travel far enough."
According to two sources familiar with intelligence activity in Iraq,
the U.S. may have been aided by information delivered either to UNSCOM
or SCS from Ericsson, the Swedish telecommunications firm. It's not an
unreasonable assumption; though Ericsson brushes off questions about
it, in 1996 a Middle Eastern businessman filed suit against the
company, claiming, among other things, that it had stiffed him on his
commission for brokering a deal between the Iraqis and Ericsson for
sensitive defense communications equipment, which, reportedly,
included encrypted cell phones.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, a veteran intelligence official
confirmed that the NSA has "arrangements" with other communications
firms that allow NSA to access supposedly secure communications, but
cooperation from Ericsson would be "a breakthrough=97 despite our best
efforts, they always kept their distance. But it's not beyond the
realm of possibility." (This is not without precedent; though hardly
covered in the American press, it has been reported that Switzerland's
Crypto AG=97 long the supplier of cipher equipment to many of the
world's neutral and "rogue" states=97 enjoyed such an "arrangement" with
the NSA for decades. Crypto AG denies this.)
There is, however, another possible scenario regarding participation
by Ericsson in an intelligence venture. According to FAS analyst Pike,
it's much more likely that anyone doing intelligence work in Iraq
would want a schematic of Baghdad's telephone system=97 which Ericsson
installed in the late '60s and has subsequently updated. "I would find
it to be far more plausible that the U.S. intelligence community would
be interested in acquiring, and Ericsson would be interested in
supplying, the wiring diagram for Baghdad's telephone exchange than
encryption algorithms for cell phones," he says.
Also, he explains, finding ways to tap into a whole phone system or
pull short-range signals out of the air without being obvious is
clearly SCS's portfolio. "This type of risky close surveillance is
what SCS was formed to do," he says. "When you think of NSA, you think
satellites. When you think CIA, you think James Bond and microfilm.
But you don't really think of an agency whose sole purpose is to get
up real close and use the best technology there is to listen and
transmit. That's SCS."
Regarding any possible collaboration in Iraq with SCS or UNSCOM, Kathy
Egan, Ericsson spokesperson, said she had no information on such an
operation, but if there was one, "It would be classified and we would
not be able to talk about it." It's also possible, according to Mike
Frost, that cleverly disguised bugs might have been planted in
Baghdad=97 SCS, he recalls, managed to listen in on secured facilities
by bugging pigeons. But, says a retired CIA veteran, with UNSCOM
effectively dead, bugging is now out of the question. "I hope the take
from this op," he says, "was worth losing the only access the outside
world's disarmament experts had to Iraq."
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Radome Archipelago
During the Cold War there were hundreds of secret remote listening
posts spread around the globe. From large stations in the moors of
Scotland and mountains of Turkey that were complete with golf
ball=ADlike structures called "radomes" to singly operated stations in
the barren wilderness of Saint Lawrence Island between Alaska and
Siberia that had only a few antennae, these stations constituted the
ground-based portion of the United States Signals Intelligence
(SIGINT) System or "USSS."
Operated by the supersecret National Security Agency (NSA), these
stations were designed to intercept Morse Code, telephone, telex,
radar, telemetry, and other signals emanating from behind the Iron
Curtain. At one time, the NSA contemplated a worldwide, continuously
operated array of 4120 intercept stations. While the agency never
achieved that goal, it could still boast of several hundred intercept
stations. These included its ground-based "outstations," which were
supplemented by other intercept units located on ships, submarines,
aircraft (from U-2s to helicopters), unmanned drones, mobile vans,
aerostats (balloons and dirigibles), and even large and cumbersome
backpacks.
With the collapse of the Communist "bloc" and the advent of
microwaves, fiber optics, and cellular phones, NSA's need for numerous
ground-based intercept stations waned. It began to rely on a
constellation of sophisticated SIGINT satellites with code names like
Vortex, Magnum, Jumpseat, and Trumpet to sweep up the world's
satellite, microwave, cellular, and high-frequency communications and
signals. Numerous outstations met with one of three fates: they were
shut down completely, remoted to larger facilities called Regional
SIGINT Operations Centers or "RSOCs," or were turned over to host
nation SIGINT agencies to be operated jointly with NSA.
However, NSA's jump to relying primarily on satellites proved
premature. In 1993, Somali clan leader Mohammed Farah Aideed taught
the agency an important lesson. Aideed's reliance on older and
lower-powered walkie-talkies and radio transmitters made his
communications virtually silent to the orbiting SIGINT "birds" of the
NSA. Therefore, NSA technicians came to realize there was still a need
to get in close in some situations to pick up signals of interest. In
NSA's jargon this is called improving "hearability."
As NSA outstations were closed or remoted, new and relatively smaller
intercept facilities=97 such as the "gateway" facility in Bahrain,
reportedly used for retransmit signals intercepted in Baghdad last
year to the U.S.=97 sprang up around the world. In addition to providing
NSA operators with fresh and exotic duty stations, the new stations
reflected an enhanced mission for NSA economic intelligence gathering.
Scrapping its old Cold War A and B Group SIGINT organization, NSA
expanded the functions of its W Group to include SIGINT operations
against a multitude of targets. Another unit, M Group, would handle
intercepts from new technologies like the Internet.
Many people who follow the exploits of SIGINT and NSA are eager to
peruse lists of secret listening posts operated by the agency and its
partners around the world. While a master list probably exists
somewhere in the impenetrable lair that is the NSA's Fort Meade,
Maryland, headquarters, it is assuredly stamped with one of the
highest security classifications in the U.S. intelligence community. =97
W.M. & J.V.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States SIGINT System (USSS)
The following list is the best unclassified shot at describing the
locations of the ground-based "ears" of the Puzzle Palace. It is
culled from press accounts, informed experts, and books written about
the NSA and its intelligence partners. It does not include the
numerous listening units on naval vessels and aircraft nor those
operating from U.S. and foreign embassies, consulates, and other
diplomatic missions.
United States
=95 NSA Headquarters, Fort Meade, Maryland=20
=95 Buckley Air National Guard Ground Base, Colorado=20
=95 Fort Gordon, Georgia (RSOC)=20
=95 Imperial Beach, California=20
=95 Kunia, Hawaii (RSOC)=20
=95 Northwest, Virginia=20
=95 Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico=20
=95 San Antonio, Texas (RSOC)=20
=95 Shemya, Alaska -3=20
=95 Sugar Grove, West Virginia=20
=95 Winter Harbor, Maine=20
=95 Yakima, Washington=20
Albania=20
=95 Durr=EBs -6=20
=95 Shkod=EBr -6=20
=95 Tirana -6=20
Ascension Island=20
=95 Two Boats -1=20
Australia=20
=95 Bamaga -6 -7=20
=95 Cabarlah -7=20
=95 Canberra (Defense Signals Directorate Headquarters) -5=20
=95 Harman -7=20
=95 Kojarena, Geraldton -1=20
=95 Nurunggar -1=20
=95 Pearce -1=20
=95 Pine Gap, Alice Springs -1=20
=95 Riverina -7=20
=95 Shoal Bay, Darwin -1=20
=95 Watsonia -1=20
Austria=20
=95 Konigswarte -7=20
=95 Neulengbach -7=20
Bahrain=20
=95 Al-Muharraq Airport -3=20
Bosnia and Herzegovina=20
=95 Tuzla=20
Botswana=20
=95 Mapharangwane Air Base=20
British Indian Ocean Territory=20
=95 Diego Garcia -1=20
Brunei=20
=95 Bandar Seri Begawan -7=20
Canada=20
=95 Alert -7=20
=95 Gander -7=20
=95 Leitrim -1=20
=95 Masset -6 -7=20
=95 Ottawa [Communications Security Establishment (CSE) Headquarters] -5=20
China=20
=95 Korla -1 -6=20
=95 Qitai -1 -6=20
Croatia=20
=95 Brac Island, Croatia -6=20
=95 Zagreb-Lucko Airport -7=20
Cuba=20
=95 Guantanamo Bay=20
Cyprus=20
=95 Ayios Nikolaos -1=20
Denmark=20
=95 Aflandshage -7=20
=95 Almindingen, Bornholm -7=20
=95 Dueodde, Bornholm -7=20
=95 Gedser -7=20
=95 Hj=F8rring -7=20
=95 L=F8gumkl=F8ster -7=20
Eritrea=20
=95 Dahlak Island -1 (NSA/Israel "8200" site)=20
Estonia=20
=95 Tallinn -7=20
Ethiopia=20
=95 Addis Ababa -1=20
Finland=20
=95 Santahamina -7=20
French Guiana=20
=95 Kourou -7 (German Federal Intelligence Service station)=20
Germany=20
=95 Achern -7=20
=95 Ahrweiler -7=20
=95 Bad Aibling -2=20
=95 Bad M=FCnstereifel -7=20
=95 Braunschweig -7=20
=95 Darmstadt -7=20
=95 Frankfurt -7=20
=95 Hof -7=20
=95 Husum -7=20
=95 Mainz -7=20
=95 Monschau -7=20
=95 Pullach (German Federal Intelligence Service Headquarters) -5=20
=95 Rheinhausen -7=20
=95 Stockdorf -7=20
=95 Strassburg -7=20
=95 Vogelweh, Germany=20
Gibraltar=20
=95 Gibraltar -7=20
Greece=20
=95 Ir=E1klion, Crete=20
Guam=20
=95 Finegayan=20
Hong Kong=20
=95 British Consulate, Victoria ("The Alamo") -7=20
Iceland=20
=95 Keflavik -3=20
India=20
=95 Charbatia -7=20
Israel=20
=95 Herzliyya (Unit 8200 Headquarters) -5=20
=95 Mitzpah Ramon -7=20
=95 Mount Hermon, Golan Heights -7=20
=95 Mount Meiron, Golan Heights -7=20
Italy=20
=95 San Vito -6=20
=95 Sorico=20
Japan=20
=95 Futenma, Okinawa=20
=95 Hanza, Okinawa=20
=95 Higashi Chitose -7=20
=95 Higashi Nemuro -7=20
=95 Kofunato -7=20
=95 Miho -7=20
=95 Misawa=20
=95 Nemuro -7=20
=95 Ohi -7=20
=95 Rebunto -7=20
=95 Shiraho -7=20
=95 Tachiarai -7=20
=95 Wakkanai=20
Korea (South)=20
=95 Kanghwa-do Island -7=20
=95 Osan -1=20
=95 Pyong-dong Island -7=20
=95 P'yongt'aek -1=20
=95 Taegu -1 -2 -6=20
=95 Tongduchon -1=20
=95 Uijo=9Dngbu -1=20
=95 Yongsan -1=20
Kuwait=20
=95 Kuwait=20
Latvia=20
=95 Ventspils -7=20
Lithuania=20
=95 Vilnius -7=20
Netherlands=20
=95 Amsterdam (Technical Intelligence Analysis Center (TIVC)
Headquarters)-5=20
=95 Emnes -7=20
=95 Terschelling -7=20
New Zealand=20
=95 Tangimoana -7=20
=95 Waihopai -1=20
=95 Wellington (Government Communications Security Bureau Headquarters
-5=20
Norway=20
=95 Borhaug -7=20
=95 Fauske/Vetan -7=20
=95 Jessheim -7=20
=95 Kirkenes -1=20
=95 Randaberg -7=20
=95 Skage/Namdalen -7=20
=95 Vads=F8 -7=20
=95 Vard=F8 -7=20
=95 Viksjofellet -7=20
Oman=20
=95 Abut -1=20
=95 Goat Island, Musandam Peninsula -3=20
=95 Khasab, Musandam Peninsula -3=20
=95 Masirah Island -3=20
Pakistan=20
=95 Parachinar=20
Panama=20
=95 Galeta Island -3=20
Papua New Guinea=20
=95 Port Moresby -7=20
Portugal=20
=95 Terceira Island, Azores=20
Rwanda=20
=95 Kigali=20
S=E3o Tom=E9 and Pr=EDncipe=20
=95 Pinheiro=20
Saudi Arabia=20
=95 Araz -7=20
=95 Khafji -7=20
Singapore=20
=95 Kranji -7=20
Spain=20
=95 Pico de las Nieves, Grand Canary Island -7=20
=95 Manzanares -7=20
=95 Playa de Pals -3=20
=95 Rota=20
Solomon Islands=20
=95 Honiara -7=20
Sri Lanka=20
=95 Iranawilla=20
Sweden=20
=95 Karlskrona -7=20
=95 Lov=F6n (Swedish FRA Headquarters) -7=20
=95 Musk=F6 -7=20
Switzerland=20
=95 Merishausen -7=20
=95 R=FCthi -7=20
Taiwan:=20
=95 Quemoy -7=20
=95 Matsu -7=20
=95 Shu Lin Kuo -5 (German Federal Intelligence Service/NSA/Taiwan J-3
SIGINT
service site)=20
Turkey=20
=95 Adana=20
=95 Agri -7=20
=95 Antalya -7=20
=95 Diyarbakir=20
=95 Edirne -7=20
=95 Istanbul -7=20
=95 Izmir -7=20
=95 Kars=20
=95 Sinop -7=20
Thailand=20
=95 Aranyaprathet -7=20
=95 Khon Kaen -1 -3=20
=95 Surin -7=20
=95 Trat -7=20
Uganda=20
=95 Kabale=20
=95 Galangala Island, Ssese Islands (Lake Victoria)=20
United Arab Emirates=20
=95 Az-Zarqa=AF -3=20
=95 Dalma=AF -3=20
=95 Ras al-Khaimah -3=20
=95 Sir Abu Nuayr Island -3=20
United Kingdom:=20
=95 Belfast (Victoria Square) -7=20
=95 Brora, Scotland -7=20
=95 Cheltenham (Government Communications Headquarters) -5=20
=95 Chicksands -7=20
=95 Culm Head -7=20
=95 Digby -7=20
=95 Hawklaw, Scotland -7=20
=95 Irton Moor -7=20
=95 Menwith Hill, Harrogate -1 (RSOC)=20
=95 Molesworth -1=20
=95 Morwenstow -1=20
=95 Westminster, London -7=20
=95 (Palmer Street)=20
=95 Yemen=20
=95 Socotra Island (planned)=20
KEY:=20
-1 Joint facility operated with a SIGINT partner.=20
-2 Joint facility partially operated with a SIGINT partner.=20
-3 Contractor-operated facility.=20
-4 Remoted facility.=20
-5 NSA liaison is present.=20
-6 Joint NSA-CIA site.=20
-7 Foreign-operated "accommodation site" that provides occasional
SIGINT
product to the USSS.=20
Tell us what you think. editor@villagevoice.com=20
