[107830] in Cypherpunks
The Case of the Spies Without a Country
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (jei@zor.hut.fi)
Sun Jan 24 23:16:45 1999
From: jei@zor.hut.fi
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 1999 06:02:58 +0200 (EET)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Reply-To: jei@zor.hut.fi
http://jya.com/desfoxnox.htm
17 January 1999. Thanks to Anonymous.
Note to contributors: We appreciate receiving articles like these
for enlightenment; the URLs would be welcome as well so we may
offer links to the originals to onion the Net sniffers who'd get a
whiff here and point for m'lord's shooter's beady bloodeye.
http://www.nytimes.com/library/review/011799unscom-review.html
The New York Times, 17 January 1999
The Case of the Spies Without a Country
By Tim Weiner
WASHINGTON -- Throughout this murderous century, diplomats and
dreamers have envisioned a world in which nations would transcend
their boundaries, dispel their differences and band together to
preserve peace against dictators and despots.
This vision of world federation helped create the United Nations. And
it engendered the U.N. Special Commission, charged with disarming Iraq
after the 1991 gulf war.
The commission, known as UNSCOM, became an international intelligence
service for the new world order. It was the first of its kind -- and,
it now seems, maybe the last.
For the more secret its work became, and the more estranged the
enforcers of disarmament grew from each other, the less UNSCOM could
withstand accusations of serving the last superpower, its main
supplier of spycraft: the United States.
More than 7,000 weapons inspectors from around the world served UNSCOM
over seven years, spying on Iraq, surveying its military and
industrial plants, trying to do what smart bombs could not: destroy
nuclear, biological, chemical and missile programs hidden by Saddam
Hussein.
Ideally, intelligence can achieve victory without war. But espionage
is a uniquely national enterprise. While nations may share interests,
spy services rarely do. "There are friendly states, but no friendly
intelligence services," notes a spokesman for Russia's foreign
intelligence agency. When spies from two countries shake hands, they
are often trying to pick one another's pockets.
When the going got tough for UNSCOM, it sought U.S. spy technology.
U.S. intelligence gladly provided it but would not share it with the
world. The more secretive UNSCOM's work became, the less open it
could be with its member nations.
"If secret information is open to all member states, it won't work,"
said Gordon Oehler, former director of the CIA's Nonproliferation
Center. "If you let in the French, the Chinese, the Russians -- that
would kill it."
So much for international cooperation. In March the special commission
adopted a U.S. eavesdropping system so secret that only a handful of
Americans, British, Australians and New Zealanders had full access to
it.
This, understandably, led to tensions, notably between the Americans
on one side and the Russians, the Chinese and the French on the other.
The special commission began as a unique experiment. It was assembled
quickly after the 1991 gulf war, when Iraq was shattered and powerless
and the world seemed united in the determination to disarm that
country. It assumed unconditional power to do its work.
"It brought together communities -- intelligence, military,
non-proliferation -- from around the world, and it brought new
thinking about how to do inspections," said David Albright, president
of the Institute for Science and International Security, who served as
a nuclear-weapons inspector in Iraq. Its leaders thought they could
disarm Iraq in no time -- "possibly as little as a year," its
chairman, Richard Butler, said last week.
But, as Butler conceded, "it has taken eight years, and the job is
still not completely finished."
Not until 1995 did the inspectors understand that Iraq had an
extraordinary system to hide its secret weapons programs. Now three
more years have gone by trying to pierce that shield. And as it turned
out, the secret weapons -- the foundation of Saddam's power, the ace
in the hole with which he might someday trump the world -- were hidden
by the same soldiers and spies whose duty it is to make sure that the
Iraqi dictator dies peacefully in bed. That made piercing the Iraqi
veil far more difficult than anyone had expected, and prompted the
Americans to roll out the particularly sophisticated and sensitive
equipment that yielded a a product they were reluctant to share too
widely.
"Iraq is a sovereign nation, and there are limits to what you can do
if that nation wants to hide things from you," Oehler said. "The best
you can do is make it very painful for them if they won't go along."
Iraq has endured great pain -- including perhaps $150 billion in lost
oil revenues -- to defy disarmament.
"The lesson is you can't disarm a country unless you're willing to
occupy it and forbid them the trappings of a sovereign nation, such as
a military force and the right to built that force," Oehler said.
But no one has been willing to conquer Iraq in the name of world
peace. And America's French and Russian partners on the Security
Council are increasingly eager to resume business with Baghdad, which
owes them billions of dollars.
Now the international coalition assembled by President George Bush for
the gulf war has dwindled to two nations: the United States and
Britain. Their four-day attack on Iraq in December was "the first
time in history that a nation has gone to war to stop the spread of
weapons of mass destruction," said Joseph Cirincione, director of the
nonproliferation project at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace.
If so, it failed, said Scott Ritter, the former marine who resigned
from UNSCOM in August to protest what he called a lack of U.S.
support. His accusations have helped raise suspicions that the
Americans used information supposedly gathered for UNSCOM to precisely
target Iraqi units closely linked to Saddam.
The attack was a final blow with which "the U.S. killed UNSCOM,"
Ritter said. "The U.S. brought its own credibility and objectivity
into question. And the U.S. lost a lot of its moral authority to lead
on this issue."
Now UNSCOM is banished from Iraq and bloodied by international
infighting. The United States is back to taking potshots at Iraq,
playing Globocop, a role that alienates it from much of the rest of
the world. America's allies in the region are fed up with Saddam, but
their patience for U.S. bombing raids is wearing thin.
Butler bravely hopes for a new and improved UNSCOM. But now the French
and the Russians are proposing lifting the oil embargo on Iraq in
exchange for a new system of overseeing Iraqi weaponry -- and the
Russians want to abolish the special commission altogether. The United
States is against those proposals. In any case, Iraq will not submit
to more inspections unless it is freed entirely from the
eight-year-old economic embargo.
The experiment in international intelligence is over. No one knows how
a new arms control regime can be installed in Iraq. And no one knows
how much more pain Iraq is willing to endure to hide its secret cache.
Today, on the eighth anniversary of the launching of the gulf war,
Iraq's chances of rebuilding a secret arsenal look good. The future
for world federations devoted to disarmament looks bleak.
Copyright 1999 The New York Times Company
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http://search.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPlate/1999-01/17/127l-011799-idx.html
The Washington Post, 17 January 1999, Page B01
Desert Fox Delivery Precision Undermined Its Purpose
By William M. Arkin
When U.S. bombs and missiles fell on Iraq on the evening of Dec. 16,
one of their principal targets was Saddam Hussein's sleeping quarters
on the outskirts of Baghdad. But that was only one of the sites on the
military's list of places to bomb in the sprawling Radwaniyah complex
adjacent to the now-vacant Saddam International Airport.
The targeting list was stunning in its specificity. Bombs were dropped
on separate buildings that house secret units of the infamous Special
Security Organization (SSO) and the Special Republican Guards (SRG),
including the barracks of the 5th Battalion of the 1st Brigade, the
8th Battalion of the 2nd Brigade, the 3rd Artillery Battalion, and the
1st Armored Battalion of the 4th Brigade.
Thanks to the hard work of the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM), U.S. targeters know a lot more about the Iraqi regime today
than they did during the Gulf War in 1991. The United States and
Britain now have a diagrammatic understanding of the Iraqi government
structure, as well as of the intelligence, security and transport
organizations that protect the Iraqi leadership. The same mission
folders that UNSCOM put together to inspect specific buildings and
offices in its search for concealed Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) became the basis for the targeting folders that missile
launchers and pilots used in December.
Welcome to the true Operation Desert Fox.
It is clear from the target list, and from extensive communications
with almost a dozen officers and analysts knowledgeable about Desert
Fox planning, that the U.S.-British bombing campaign was more than a
reflexive reaction to Saddam Hussein's refusal to cooperate with
UNSCOM's inspectors. The official rationale for Desert Fox may remain
the "degrading" of Iraq's ability to produce weapons of mass
destruction and the "diminishing" of the Iraqi threat to its
neighbors. But careful study of the target list tells another story.
Thirty-five of the 100 targets were selected because of their role in
Iraq's air defense system, an essential first step in any air war,
because damage to those sites paves the way for other forces and
minimizes casualties all around. Only 13 targets on the list are
facilities associated with chemical and biological weapons or
ballistic missiles, and three are southern Republican Guard bases that
might be involved in a repeat invasion of Kuwait.
The heart of the Desert Fox list (49 of the 100 targets) is the Iraqi
regime itself: a half-dozen palace strongholds and their supporting
cast of secret police, guard and transport organizations. Some sites,
such as Radwaniyah, had been bombed in 1991 (Saddam's quarters there
were designated "L01" in Desert Storm, meaning the first target in the
Leadership category). Other sites, particularly "special" barracks and
units in and around downtown Baghdad and the outlying palaces, were
bombed for the first time.
National security insiders, blessed with their unprecedented
intelligence bonanza from UNSCOM, convinced themselves that bombing
Saddam Hussein's internal apparatus would drive the Iraqi leader
around the bend. "We've penetrated your security, we're inside your
brain," is the way one senior administration official described the
message that the United States was sending Saddam Hussein.
Without the target list, such a view seems like sheer bravado. With
the target list, a host of new questions arises: Is the
administration's view of Saddam Hussein's hold on power in line with
reality? And what is the feasibility, not to mention the legality, of
what amounts to an aerial assassination strategy?
The origins of the Desert Fox target list go back to October, when
high-level discussions in Washington led to the conclusion that
military action was not only inevitable, but that it might actually
achieve something. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM), headquartered in Tampa, began to articulate the
military mission of "degrading" and "diminishing" Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction. Gen. Anthony Zinni, the CENTCOM commander, insisted
that the United States only bomb Iraqi sites that had been identified
with a high degree of certainty, according to officers involved in the
process.
Given the UNSCOM data flowing in, there was no end of choices. Seven
broad target categories were created, including two--"WMD security"
and "command and control"--that would accommodate the new intelligence
reports and cover an effort to shake the Iraqi regime to its core.
By November, a plan was in place. WMD targets themselves were small in
number, given Zinni's directive. The main emphasis would be on Iraq's
short-range missile program. The Bush administration had acceded to a
Soviet proposal in 1991 to allow Iraq to have missiles with a range
under 150 kilometers. U.S. intelligence had concluded that Iraq was
using the short-range facilities as a cover for redeveloping
long-range missiles.
All of the suspected facilities--Ibn al Haytham, Karama, Al Kindi in
Mosul, Shahiyat, Taji and Zaafaraniyah--were under UNSCOM camera
monitoring. In fact, UNSCOM had cataloged specific pieces of
irreplaceable equipment that, if destroyed, would set back any
conversion effort.
There were non-missile WMD targets as well: the Biological Research
Center at Baghdad University, which UNSCOM concluded was the office of
the head of Iraq's biological weapons program ("Doctor Germ," they
dubbed her), and two airfields--Al Sahra near Tikrit and Tallil in the
south--which were believed to house drone aircraft that could deliver
a biological cloud in an attack.
Some have criticized the Desert Fox campaign for not going after
suspected production sites of biological or chemical agents. The
common refrain is that the United States avoided such targets because
of the potential for collateral damage, but this is not true. The
targeters could not identify actual weapons sites with enough
specificity to comply with Zinni's directive.
At a Pentagon briefing on Jan. 7, Zinni said the ease with which
chemical and biological agents can be manufactured, particularly for
terrorist type use, made bombing of potential dual-use facilities
(such as pharmaceutical plants) futile. "There isn't going to be
anything militarily" to eliminate or signficantly degrade those
capabilities, he said, "if they're that easy to . . . establish."
How could a 70-hour bombing campaign possibly generate an outcome that
the utter defeat of the Iraqi army and tens of thousand of airstrikes
over 43 days failed to deliver? The answer is again in the target
list--and in the administration's belief that ever more accurate bombs
and unprecedented target data can have far-reaching reverberations.
Desert Fox's most significant departure from Desert Storm is its
targeting of offices associated with Saddam Hussein's entourage and
advisers, the Iraqi intelligence and Ba'ath party organizations, and
the security and transport apparatus that is so essential for Saddam's
survival. Many of these top-level targets were hit in 1991 (Gen.
Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calls them
"highly visible symbols of the regime"), but the 1998 campaign locked
in on sites not even known eight years ago. For example, the office of
Abed Hamid Mahmoud, Saddam Hussein's chief of staff, was attacked,
albeit under the innocuous target name of "Secretariat Presidential
Building." The SSO computer center as well as intelligence archives
also were targeted. In 1991, only two installations associated with
the protection of Saddam Hussein were hit. In Desert Fox, this group
makes up 20 percent of the total of all targets.
Other targets also reflected the strategy to weaken the regime's
control. Two corps and four division headquarters installations of the
"regular" Republican Guards were hit, as were helicopter bases at
Samarra East, K2 airfield near Baiji, Taji and Kut. Like the decision
to allow short-range missiles, the United States was snookered into
allowing Iraq the use of its helicopters after Desert Storm, and they
were subsequently used to suppress the Shiite and Kurdish rebellions.
The misstep has stuck in the U.S. craw ever since.
More than a dozen eavesdropping and jamming units, telephone
exchanges, and radio and television transmitters were attacked in
Baghdad, Basra and the south, Abu Ghraib, Rashidiya (just north of the
capital) and Tikrit. Part of the goal of disrupting telephone and
television service was to impede military communications and undermine
Iraqi propaganda efforts. But attacking secret police archives and
intelligence stations also has the purpose of disrupting Baghdad's
ability to monitor the internal situation.
Desert Fox pleased many active and retired officers who played a role
in the 1991 air war. These Desert Storm insiders say they feel
vindicated by the administration's decision to target the Iraqi
leadership. They felt they were constrained Saddam Hussein in earnest
in 1991, and argue that the United States and the world is still
paying the price for Washington's hesitation at the time.
But there is also disquiet. "A good concept, but too little, too
late," said one senior officer. Not only was Desert Fox constrained
by time, breadth and the sheer physical destruction possible with
1,000 weapons, but a host of other priorities--to minimize civilian
deaths, prevent U.S. casualties and deflect political
fallout--undercut the overall goal.
According to military sources, there was no leeway in the strict
timetable, and the decision to achieve surprise before Ramadan served
to give Iraq a 30-day break. Attacks were mounted only at night,
ceding daylight hours for recovery and dispersal. An Iraqi sanctuary
existed above the 35th parallel. And certain targets were avoided
altogether, such as electrical power sites, for fear of a cascading
effect on the civilian population and negative publicity.
To administration officials, the plight of the Iraqi people is the
only hot-button issue that could undermine their "topple" strategy.
Saddam Hussein and his cronies have built installations and
institutions to insulate themselves and their lives from Iraqi society
at large. Saddam's guardians have been showered by extra pay and
treatment. To inflict further harm on this privileged inner circle,
CIA analysts added the Tikrit food warehouse and a distribution
manifold on the Gulf coast south of the Basra refinery to the bombing
list--part of an "economic strangulation" plan to disrupt the illicit
cash and rations pipeline.
Two pitiful targets to achieve that goal? More than anything else, it
is the very precision and economy of Desert Fox that ultimately
undermined its true purpose. "The Iraqis are professional cruise
missile recipients," one recently retired four-star general observed
in December as bulldozers and laborers arrived at bombed sites on the
Monday after Desert Fox ended. With almost half the population
unemployed, rebuilding is as close as anything to a national jobs
program in Iraq.
CENTCOM estimates that it will take Iraq from one to two months to
restore the smuggling operation from the Basra refinery. And then it
will undoubtedly be bombed again.
William Arkin, an independent defense analyst, spent two months in
Iraq after the Gulf War and has written extensively on Operation
Desert Storm. His column, DOT.MIL, appears every other Monday on The
Post's Web site, www.washingtonpost.com.
Zeroed In
Of the 100 targets on the list for Operation Desert Fox in Iraq, 87
were hit. A breakdown of the seven categories and their key areas is
as follows:
COMMAND AND CONTROL: 18 of 20 targets hit
Abu Rajash, Jabul Makhul, Radwaniyah, Republican (Baghdad), Sijood
palaces
Ba'ath party headquarters
Iraq Intelligence Service headquarters
Ministry of Defense
Ministry of Industry
Presidential Secretariat Building
State radio and television
WMD INDUSTRY AND PRODUCTION: 12 of 12 targets hit
Biological Research Center (Baghdad University)
Ibn al Haytham missile R&D center
Karama electronics plant
Al Kindi missile R&D facility (Mosul)
Shahiyat liquid engine R&D, T&E facility
Zaafaraniyah fabrication facility (Nidda)
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) SECURITY:
18 of 18 targets hit
Directorate of General Security headquarters
Special Security Organization (SS0) headquarters
Special Republican Guards (SRG) headquarters
SSO Communications/Computer Center
SSO/SRG barracks (Abu Ghraib, Radwinyah, Baghdad, Tikrit)
REPUBLICAN GUARDS: 9 of 9 targets hit
ECONOMIC: 1 of 1 targets hit
Basra refinery distribution manifold
AIRFIELDS: 5 of 6 targets hit
AIR DEFENSES: 24 of 34 targets hit
Sources: U.S. Central Command, Department of Defense
Copyright 1999 The Washington Post Company
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