[107284] in Cypherpunks
Re: Suggestion for Public Echelon counter-measures
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (John Young)
Fri Jan 8 14:16:00 1999
Date: Fri, 08 Jan 1999 13:39:03 -0500
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
From: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
In-Reply-To: <36963B6B.21BD669A@stud.uni-muenchen.de>
Reply-To: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
Mok-Kon Shen wrote:
>If every person use encryption, the eavesdropping agencies will
>hardly get informations they intend to find.
Perhaps they will: According to news reports today the eavesdropping
device planted in Iraq allegedly grabbed plain and encrypted
data for transmitting to a remote receiver in Bahrain where it was
rendered accessible by NSA:
http://jya.com/rhn010899.htm
Though the type and strength of crypto was not described it may
have been Lotus Notes Easy Access, or a bank/insurance special
access program, in lieu of legacy Crypto AG.
To be sure, that art of the "level-playing field" business deal may
have been what got RSA's friendly cooperation from BXA for its
Aussie venture, as for the heritage arrangement for IBM and ilk.
Not that Eric and Tim would have been told that (at least non-NDA),
any more than PRZ was told what NAI was doing behind his back
to assure a comfortable future.
The key to assured success is to not look to closely at what is
being done to insure it. Bidzos does his job for the original RSA
rather swell, considering what they endured out in the cold.
Scott Ritter may be wondering what his buddies used him
for, too. And Madeliene Albright wondering what the
terrorist-monitoring warhawks set her up with deliberate
security neglect of the embassies.
ElGamal, too. God bless them all for smelling the coffee,
believing hard work and sacrifice and sticking by principle
are finally paying off. Spin it is.
